Abstract. It has been shown recently that coding for the Gaussian Wiretap Channel can be done with nested lattices. A fine lattice intended to the legitimate user must be designed as a usual lattice code for the Gaussian Channel, while a coarse lattice is added to introduce confusion at the eavesdropper, whose theta series must be minimized. We study, here, the behavior of this invariant for a class of lattices.
Introduction
The wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner [1] as a discrete memoryless broadcast channel where the sender, Alice, transmits confidential messages to a legal receiver Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. Wyner defined the perfect secrecy capacity as the maximum amount of information that Alice can send to Bob while insuring that Eve gets a negligeable amount of information. He also described a generic coding strategy known as coset coding. While coset coding has been used in many coding scenarios (for ex. [2, 3] ), Wyner used it to encode both data and random bits to confuse the eavesdropper. The question of determining the secrecy capacity of many classes of channels has been addressed extensively recently, yielding a plethora of information theoretical results on secrecy capacity.
There is a sharp contrast with the situation of wiretap code designs, where very little is known. The most exploited approach to get practical codes so far has been to use LDPC codes (for example [4] for binary erasure and symmetric channels, [5] for Gaussian channels with binary inputs). We also note that wiretap II codes have been extended to more general settings such as network coding in [6] . Finally, lattice codes for Gaussian channels have been considered from an information theoretical point of view in [7] .
In [8] , a design criterion for constructing explicit lattice codes, has been proposed, based on the analysis of Eve's correct decision probability. This design criterion relies on a new lattice invariant called "secrecy gain" based on theta series. In this paper, we analyze the secrecy gain of unimodular lattices.
Notations and System Model
We analyze more deeply the secrecy gain introduced in [8] for even unimodular lattices and give the asymptotic behavior of this secrecy gain when the dimension of the lattices grows to infinity. Figure 1 gives the model considered in this . Eve is the eavesdropper trying to intercept data through another Gaussian channel whose noise variance is σ 2 e . In order to have a positive secrecy capacity, we will assume that σ 2 e > σ 2 b . Bits are transmitted by Alice at a rate equal to R = R s + R r where R s is the secrecy rate of this transmission and R r is the rate of pseudo-random bits. Indeed, we use Wyner's generic coding strategy [9] . We give the remaining parameters, -Λ b is the fine lattice (used to minimize Bob's probability of error) -Λ e is the coarse lattice (used to minimize Eve's probability of correct decision) -n is the dimension of both lattices -V (Λ b ) (resp. V (Λ e )) is the fundamental parallelotope of Λ b (resp. Λ e ) -Vol (P) is the volume of P Data bits label cosets in Λ b /Λ e while pseudo-random bits label points of Λ e . The reader can refer to [8] for a more detailed description of the coding scheme. Still according to [8] , and under the assumption of a moderate to high secrecy rate, the expression of the probability of correct decision at the eavesdropper can be expressed as 
In eq.
(1), we recognize the theta series of lattice Λ e .
